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Glossary and Notation
Repeated game with incomplete information: a situation where several
players repeat the same stage game, the players having different knowledge of the
stage game which is repeated.
Strategy of a player: a rule, or program, describing the action taken by the
player in any possible case which may happen.
Strategy profile: a vector containing a strategy for each player.
Lack of information on one side: particular case where all the players but
one perfectly know the stage game which is repeated.
Zero-sum games: 2-player games where the players have opposite payoffs.
Value: Solution (or price) of a zero-sum game, in the sense of the fair amount
that player 1 should give to player 2 to be entitled to play the game.
Equilibrium: Strategy profile where each player’s strategy is in best reply
against the strategy of the other players.
Completely revealing strategy: strategy of a player which eventually reveals
to the other players everything known by this player on the selected state.
Non revealing strategy: strategy of a player which reveals nothing on the
selected state.
1March 3, 2008
2I thank Franc¸oise Forges, Sergiu Hart, Dinah Rosenberg, Robert Simon and Eilon Solan
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The simplex of probabilities over a finite set: for a finite set S, we denote
by ∆(S) the set of probabilities over S, and we identify ∆(S) to {p = (ps)s∈S ∈
IRS, ∀s ∈ S ps ≥ 0 and
∑
s∈S ps = 1}. Given s in S, the Dirac measure on s will
be denoted by δs. For p = (ps)s∈S and q = (qs)s∈S in IRS, we will use, unless
otherwise specified, ‖p− q‖ = ∑s∈S |ps − qs|.
I. Definition of the Subject and its Importance
Introduction
In a repeated game with incomplete information, there is a basic interaction
called stage game which is repeated over and over by several participants called
players. The point is that the players do not perfectly know the stage game which
is repeated, but rather have different knowledge about it. As illustrative exam-
ples, one may think of the following situations: an oligopolistic competition where
firms don’t know the production costs of their opponents, a financial market where
traders bargain over units of an asset which terminal value is imperfectly known,
a cryptographic model where some participants want to transmit some informa-
tion (e.g., a credit card number) without being understood by other participants,
a conflict when a particular side may be able to understand the communications
inside the opponent side (or might have a particular type of weapons),...
Natural questions arising in this context are as follows. What is the optimal
behavior of a player with a perfect knowledge of the stage game ? Can we
determine which part of the information such a player should use ? Can we price
the value of possessing a particular information ? How should one player behave
while having only a partial information ?
Foundations of games with incomplete information have been studied in [27]
and [55]. Repeated games with incomplete information have been introduced in
the sixties by Aumann and Maschler [87], and we present here the basic and fun-
damental results of the domain. Let us start with a few well known elementary
examples ([87], [93]).
Basic Examples In each example, there are two players, and the game is zero-
sum, i.e. player 2’s payoff always is the opposite of player 1’s payoff. There are two
states a and b, and the possible stage games are given by two real matrices Ga and
Gb with identical size. Initially a true state of nature k ∈ {a, b} is selected with
even probability between a and b, and k is announced to player 1 only. Then the
matrix game Gk is repeated over and over: at every stage, simultaneously player
1 chooses a row i, whereas player 2 chooses a column j, the stage payoff for player
1 is then Gk(i, j) but only i and j are publicly announced before proceeding to
the next stage. Players are patient and want to maximize their long-run average
expected payoffs.
Example 1: Ga =
(
0 0
0 −1
)
and Gb =
( −1 0
0 0
)
.
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This example is trivial. In order to maximize his payoff, player 1 just has to
play, at any stage, the Top row if the state is a and the Bottom row if the state
is b.
Example 2: Ga =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and Gb =
(
0 0
0 1
)
.
A naive strategy for player 1 would be to play at stage 1: Top if the state is
a, and Bottom if the state is b. Such a strategy is called completely revealing, or
CR, because it allows player 2 to deduce the selected state from the observation
of the actions played by player 1. This strategy of player 1 would be optimal here
if a single stage was to be played, but it is a very weak strategy on the long run
and does not guarantee more than zero at each stage t ≥ 2 (because player 2 can
play Left or Right depending on player 1’s first action).
On the opposite, player 1 may not use his information and play a non re-
vealing, or NR, strategy, i.e. a strategy which is independent of the selected
state. He can consider the average matrix 1
2
Ga + 1
2
Gb =
(
1/2 0
0 1/2
)
, and play
independently at each stage an optimal mixed action in this matrix, i.e. here
the unique mixed action 1
2
Top + 1
2
Bottom. It will turn out that this is here the
optimal behavior for player 1, and the value of the repeated game is the value of
the average matrix, i.e. 1/4.
Example 3: Ga =
(
4 0 2
4 0 −2
)
and Gb =
(
0 4 −2
0 4 2
)
.
Playing a CR strategy for player 1 does not guarantee more than zero in the
long-run, because player 2 will eventually be able to play Middle if the state is
a, and Left if the state is b. But a NR strategy will not do better, because the
average matrix 1
2
Ga + 1
2
Gb is
(
2 2 0
2 2 0
)
, hence has value 0.
We will see later that an optimal strategy for player 1 in this game is to
play as follows. Initially, player 1 chooses an element s in {T,B} as follows: if
k = a, then s = T with probability 3/4, and thus s = B with probability 1/4;
and if k = b, then s = T with probability 1/4, and s = B with probability
3/4. Then at each stage player 1 plays row s, independently of the actions taken
by player 2. The conditional probabilities satisfy: P (k = a|s = T ) = 3/4, and
P (k = a|s = B) = 1/4. At the end of stage 1, player 2 will have learnt, from
the action played by his opponent, something about the selected state: his belief
on the state will move from 1
2
a + 1
2
b to 3
4
a + 1
4
b or to 1
4
a + 3
4
b. But player 2 still
does not know perfectly the selected state. Such a strategy of player 1 is called
partially revealing.
General Definition
Formally, a repeated game with incomplete information is given by the fol-
lowing data. There is a set of players N , and a set of states K. Each player i in
N has a set of actions Ai and a set of signals U i, and we denote by A =
∏
i∈N A
i
the set of action profiles and by U =
∏
i∈N U
i the set of signal profiles. Every
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player i has a payoff function gi : K × A −→ IR. There is a signalling function
q : K × A −→ ∆(U), and an initial probability pi ∈ ∆(K × U). In what follows,
we will always assume the sets of players, states, actions and signals to be non
empty and finite.
A repeated game with incomplete information can thus be denoted by Γ =
(N,K, (Ai)i∈N , (U i)i∈N , (gi)i∈N , q, pi). The progress of the game is the following.
• Initially, an element (k, (ui0)i) is selected according to pi: k is the realized
state of nature and will remain fixed, and each player i learns ui0 (and nothing
more than ui0).
• At each integer stage t ≥ 1, simultaneously every player i chooses an action
ait in A
i, and we denote by at = (a
i
t)i the action profile played at stage t. The
stage payoff of a player i is then given by gi(k, at). A signal profile (u
t
i)i is se-
lected according to q(k, at), and each player i learns u
i
t (and nothing more than
uti) before proceeding to the next stage.
Remarks:
1. The players do not necessarily know their stage payoff after each stage
(as an illustration, imagine the players bargaining over units of an asset which
terminal value will only be known “at the end” of the game). This is without loss
of generality, because it is possible to add hypotheses on q so that each player
will be able to deduce his stage payoff from his realized stage signal.
2. Repeated games with complete information are a particular case, corre-
sponding to the situation where each initial signal ui0 reveals the selected state.
Such games are studied in the chapter “Repeated games with complete informa-
tion”.
3. Games where the state variable k evolve from stage to stage, according
to the actions played, are called stochastic games. These games are not covered
here, but in a specific chapter entitled “Stochastic games”.
4. The most standard case of signalling function is when each player ex-
actly learns, at the end of each stage t, the whole action profile at. Such games
are usually called games with “perfect monitoring”, “full monitoring”, “perfect
observation” or with “observable actions”.
II. Strategies, Payoffs, Value and Equilibria
Strategies
A (behavior) strategy for player i is a rule, or program, describing the action
taken by this player in any possible case which may happen. These actions may
be chosen at random, so a strategy for player i is an element σi = (σit)t≥1, where
for each t, σit is a mapping from U
i × (U i × Ai)t−1 to ∆(Ai) giving the lottery
played by player i at stage t as a function of the past signals and actions of player
i. The set of strategies for player i is denoted by Σi.
A history of length t in Γ is a sequence (k, u0, a1, u1, ..., at, ut), and the set of
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such histories is the finite set K × U × (A × U)t. An infinite history is called a
play, the set of plays is denoted by Ω = K × U × (A× U)∞ and is endowed with
the product σ-algebra. A strategy profile σ = (σi)i naturally induces, together
with the initial probability pi, a probability distribution over the set of histories
of length t. This probability uniquely extends to a probability over plays, and is
denoted by IPpi,σ.
Payoffs
Given a time horizon T , the average expected payoff of player i, up to stage
T , if the strategy profile σ is played is denoted by:
γiT (σ) = IEIPpi,σ
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
gi(k, at)
)
.
The T -stage game is the game ΓT where simultaneously, each player i chooses a
strategy σi in Σi, then receives the payoff γiT ((σ
j)j∈N).
Given a discount factor λ in (0, 1], the λ-discounted payoff of player i is de-
noted by:
γiλ(σ) = IEIPpi,σ
(
λ
∞∑
t=1
(1− λ)t−1gi(k, at)
)
.
The λ-discounted game is the game Γλ where simultaneously, each player i chooses
a strategy σi in Σi, then receives the payoff γiλ((σ
j)j∈N).
Remark: A strategy for player i is called pure if it always plays in a deterministic
way. A mixed strategy for player i is defined as a probability distribution over the
set of pure strategies (endowed with the product σ-algebra). Kuhn’s theorem (see
[37], [3] or [92] for a modern presentation) states that mixed strategies or behav-
ior strategies are equivalent, in the following sense: for each behavior strategy σi,
there exists a mixed strategy τ i of the same player such that IPpi,σi,σ−i = IPpi,τ i,σ−i
for any strategy profile σ−i of the other players, and vice-versa if we exchange
the words “behavior” and “mixed”. Unless otherwise specified, the word strategy
will refer here to a behavior strategy, but we will also sometimes equivalently use
mixed strategies, or even mixtures of behavior strategies.
Value of zero-sum games
By definition the game is zero-sum if there are two players, say player 1 and
player 2, with opposite payoffs. The T -stage game ΓT can then be seen as a matrix
game, hence by the minmax theorem it has a value vT = supσ1 infσ2 γ
1
T (σ
1, σ2) =
infσ2 supσ1 γ
1
T (σ
1, σ2). Similarly, one can use Sion’s theorem ([71]) to show that the
λ-discounted game has a value vλ = supσ1 infσ2 γ
1
λ(σ
1, σ2) = infσ2 supσ1 γ
1
λ(σ
1, σ2).
To study long term strategic aspects, it is also important to consider the fol-
lowing notion of uniform value. Players are asked to play well uniformly in the
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time horizon, i.e. simultaneously in all game ΓT with T sufficiently large (or sim-
ilarly uniformly in the discount factor, i.e. simultaneously in all game Γλ with λ
sufficiently low).
Definitions 1: Player 1 can guarantee the real number v in the repeated game
Γ if: ∀ε > 0, ∃σ1 ∈ Σ1, ∃T0, ∀T ≥ T0, ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2, γ1T (σ1, σ2) ≥ v − ε. Simi-
larly, Player 2 can guarantee v in Γ if ∀ε > 0, ∃σ2 ∈ Σ2, ∃T0, ∀T ≥ T0, ∀σ1 ∈
Σ1, γ1T (σ
1, σ2) ≤ v + ε. If both player 1 and player 2 can guarantee v, then v is
called the uniform value of the repeated game. A strategy σ1 of player 1 satisfy-
ing ∃T0, ∀T ≥ T0, ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2, γ1T (σ1, σ2) ≥ v is then called an optimal strategy of
player 1 (optimal strategies of player 2 are defined similarly).
The uniform value, whenever it exists, is necessarily unique. Its existence is
a strong property, which implies that both vT , as T goes to infinity, and vλ, as λ
goes to zero, converge to the uniform value.
Equilibria of general-sum games
In the general case, the T -stage game ΓT can be seen as the mixed extension
of a finite game, and consequently possesses a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, the
discounted game Γλ always has, by the Nash Glicksberg theorem, a Nash equilib-
rium. Concerning uniform notions, couples of optimal strategies are generalized
as follows.
Definitions 2: A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N is a uniform Nash equilibrium of
Γ if: 1) ∀ε > 0, σ is an ε-Nash equilibrium in every finitely repeated game suffi-
ciently long, that is: ∃T0, ∀T ≥ T0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀τ i ∈ Σi, γiT (τ i, σ−i) ≤ γiT (σ) + ε,
and 2) the sequence of payoffs ((γiT (σ))i∈N)T converges to a limit payoff (γ
i(σ))i∈N
in IRN .
Remark: The initial probability pi will play a great role in the following analyses,
so we will often write γi,piT (σ) for γ
i
T (σ), vT (pi) for the value vT , etc...
III. The standard model of Aumann and Maschler
This famous model has been introduced in the sixties by Aumann and Maschler
(see the reedition [87]). It deals with zero-sum games with lack of information on
one side and observable actions, as in the basic examples previously presented.
There is a finite set of states K, an initial probability p = (pk)k∈K on K, and a
family of matrix games Gk with identical size I×J . Initially, a state k in K is se-
lected according to p, and announced to player 1 (called the informed player) only.
Then the matrix game Gk is repeated over and over: at every stage, simultane-
ously player 1 chooses a row i in I, whereas player 2 chooses a column j in J , the
stage payoff for player 1 is then Gk(i, j) but only i and j are publicly announced
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before proceeding to the next stage. Denote by M the constant maxk,i,j |Gk(i, j)|.
III.1 Basic tools: Splitting, Martingale, Concavification, and the Re-
cursive Formula
The following aspects are simple but fundamental. The initial probability p =
(pk)k∈K represents the initial belief, or a priori, of player 2 on the selected state of
nature. Assume that player 1 chooses his first action (or more generally a message
or signal s from a finite set S) according to a probability distribution depending
on the state, i.e. according to a transition probability x = (xk)k∈K ∈ ∆(S)K . For
each signal s, the probability that s is chosen is denoted λ(x, s) =
∑
k p
kxk(s),
and given s such that λ(x, s) > 0 the conditional probability on K, or a posteriori
of player 2, is pˆ(x, s) =
(
pkxk(s)
λ(x,s)
)
k∈K
. We clearly have:
p =
∑
s∈S
λ(x, s)pˆ(x, s). (1)
So the a priori p lies in the convex hull of the a posteriori. The following lemma
expresses a reciprocal: player 1 is able to induce any family of a posteriori con-
taining p in its convex hull.
Splitting lemma 1. Assume that p is written as a convex combination p =∑
s∈S λsps with positive coefficients. There exists a transition probability x ∈
∆(S)K such that ∀s ∈ S, λs = λ(x, s) and ps = pˆ(x, s).
Proof: just put xk(s) = λsp
k
s
pk
if pk > 0. 







TT
T
T
T
T
T
TT
∆(K)
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Figure 1: Splitting.
Equation 1 not only tells that the a posteriori contains p in their convex hull,
but also that the expectation of the a posteriori is the a priori. We are here in
a repeated context, and for every strategy profile σ one can define the process
(pt(σ))t≥0 of the a posteriori of player 2. We have p0 = p, and pt(σ) is the random
variable of player 2’s belief on the state after the first t stages. More precisely,
we define for any t ≥ 0, ht = (i1, j1, ..., it, jt) ∈ (I × J)t and k in K:
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pkt (σ, ht) = IPp,σ(k|ht) =
pkIPδk,σ(ht)
IPp,σ(ht)
.
pt(σ, ht) = (p
k
t (σ, ht))k∈K ∈ ∆(K) (arbitrarily defined if IPp,σ(ht) = 0) is the
conditional probability on the state of nature given that σ is played and ht has
occurred in the first t stages. It is easy to see that as soon as IPp,σ(ht) > 0,
pt(σ, ht) does not depend on player 2’s strategy σ
2, nor on player 2’s last action
jt. It is fundamental to notice that:
Martingale of a posteriori lemma 2. (pt(σ))t≥0 is a IPp,σ-martingale with
values in ∆(K).
This is indeed a general property of Bayesian learning of a fixed unknown
parameter: the expectation of what I will know tomorrow is what I know today.
This martingale is controlled by the informed player, and the splitting lemma
shows that this player can essentially induce any martingale issued from the a
priori p. Notice that, to be able to compute the realizations of the martingale,
player 2 needs to know the strategy σ1 used by player 1.
The splitting lemma also easily gives the following concavification result. Let
f be a continuous mapping from ∆(K) to IR. The smallest concave function
above f is denoted by cavf , and we have:
cavf(p) = max{∑s∈S λsf(ps), S finite, ∀s λs ≥ 0, ps ∈ ∆(K),∑s∈S λs = 1,∑
s∈S λsps = p}.
Concavification lemma 3. If for any initial probability p, the informed player
can guarantee f(p) in the game Γ(p), then for any p this player can also guarantee
cavf(p) in Γ(p).
III.2 Non revealing games
As soon as player 1 uses a strategy which depends on the selected state, the
martingale of a posteriori will move and player 2 will have learnt something on the
state. This is the dilemma of the informed player: he can not use the information
on the state without revealing information. Imagine now that player 1 decides to
reveal no information on the selected state, and plays independently of it. Since
payoffs are defined via expectations, it is as if the players were repeating the
average matrix game G(p) =
∑
k∈K p
kGk. Its value is:
u(p) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
∑
i,j
x(i)y(j)G(p)(i, j) = min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)
∑
i,j
x(i)y(j)G(p)(i, j).
u is a Lispchitz function, with constant M , from ∆(K) to IR. Clearly, player 1
can guarantee u(p) in the game Γ(p) by playing i.i.d. at each stage an optimal
strategy in G(p). By the concavification lemma, we obtain:
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Proposition 1. Player 1 can guarantee cavu(p) in the game Γ(p).
Let us come back to the examples. In example 1, we have u(p) = Val
( −(1− p) 0
0 −p
)
=
−p(1 − p), where p ∈ [0, 1] stands here for the probability of state a. This is a
convex function of p, and cavu(p) = 0 for all p. In example 2, u(p) = p(1 − p)
for all p, hence u is already concave and cavu = u. Regarding example 3, the
following picture show the functions u (regular line), and cavu (dashed line).
-
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Figure 2: u and cavu.
Let us consider again the partially revealing strategy previously described. With
probability 1/2, the a posteriori will be 3
4
a+ 1
4
b, and player 1 will play Top which
is optimal in 3
4
Ga + 1
4
Gb =
(
3 1 1
3 1 −1
)
. Similarly with probability 1/2, the a
posteriori will be 1
4
a+ 3
4
b and player 1 will play an optimal strategy in 1
4
Ga + 3
4
Gb.
Consequently, this strategy guarantees 1/2 u(3/4) + 1/2 u(1/4) = cavu(1/2) = 1
to player 1.
III.3 Player 2 can guarantee the limit value
In the infinitely repeated game with initial probability p, player 2 can play as
follows: T being fixed, he can play an optimal strategy in the T -stage game ΓT (p),
then forget everything and play again an optimal strategy in the T -stage game
ΓT (p), etc... By doing so, he guarantees vT (p) in the game Γ(p). So he can guar-
antee infT vT (p) in this game, and this implies that lim supT vT (p) ≤ infT vT (p).
As a consequence, we obtain:
Proposition 2. The sequence (vT (p))T converges to infT vT (p), and this limit
can be guaranteed by player 2 in the game Γ(p).
III.4 Uniform value: cavu theorem
We will see here that limTvT (p) is nothing but cavu(p), and since this quantity
can be guaranteed by both players this is the uniform value of the game Γ(p). The
idea of the proof is the following. The martingale (pt(σ))t≥0 is bounded, hence
will converge almost surely, and we have a bound on its L1 variation (see lemma
4 below). This means that after a certain stage the martingale will essentially
remain constant, so approximately player 1 will play in a non revealing way, so
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will not be able to have a stage payoff greater than u(q), where q if a “limit a
posteriori”. Since the expectation of the a posteriori is the a priori p, player 1
can not guarantee more than max{∑s∈S λsu(ps), S finite, ∀s ∈ S λs ≥ 0, ps ∈
∆(K),
∑
s∈S λs = 1,
∑
s∈S λsps = p}, that is more than cavu(p). Let us now
proceed to the formal proof.
Fix a strategy σ1 of player 1, and define the strategy σ2 of player 2 as follows:
play at each stage an optimal strategy in the matrix game G(pt), where pt is the
current a posteriori in ∆(K). Assume that σ = (σ1, σ2) is played in the repeated
game Γ(p). To simplify notations, we write IP for IPp,σ, pt(ht) for pt(σ, ht), etc..
We use everywhere norms ‖.‖1. To avoid confusion between variables and ran-
dom variables in the following computations, we will use tildes to denote random
variables, e.g. k˜ will denote the random variable of the selected state.
Lemma 4.
∀T ≥ 1, 1
T
T−1∑
t=0
IE(‖pt+1 − pt‖) ≤
∑
k∈K
√
pk(1− pk)√
T
.
Proof: This is a property of martingales with values in ∆(K) and expectation p.
We have for each state k and t ≥ 0: IE ((pkt+1 − pkt )2) = IE(IE((pkt+1 − pkt )2|Ht)),
where Ht is the σ-algebra on plays generated by the first t action profiles. So
IE
(
(pkt+1 − pkt )2
)
= IE(IE((pkt+1)
2 +(pkt )
2−2pkt+1pkt |Ht)) = IE((pkt+1)2)− IE((pkt )2).
So IE
(∑T−1
t=0 (p
k
t+1 − pkt )2
)
= IE
(
(pkT )
2
)−(pk)2 ≤ pk(1−pk). By Cauchy- Schwartz
inequality, we also have for each k,
IE
(
1
T
∑T−1
t=0
∣∣pkt+1 − pkt ∣∣) ≤
√
1
T
IE
(∑T−1
t=0 (p
k
t+1 − pkt )2
)
and the result follows. 
For ht in (I × J)t, σ1t+1(k, ht) is the mixed action in ∆(I) played by player
1 at stage t + 1 if the state is k and ht has previously occurred, and we write
σ¯1t+1(ht) for the law of the action of player 1 of stage t + 1 after ht: σ¯
1
t+1(ht) =∑
k∈K p
k
t (ht)σ
1
t+1(k, ht) ∈ ∆(I). σ¯t+1(ht) can be seen as the average action played
by player 1 after ht, and will be used as a non revealing approximation for
(σ1t+1(k, ht))k. The next lemma precisely links the variation of the martingale
(pt(σ))t≥0, i.e. the information revealed by player 1, and the dependence of player
1’s action on the selected state, i.e. the information used by player 1.
Lemma 5.
∀t ≥ 0, ∀ht ∈ (I × J)t, IE (‖pt+1 − pt‖ |ht) = IE
(∥∥∥σk˜t+1(ht)− σ¯t+1(ht)∥∥∥ |ht) .
Proof: Fix t ≥ 0 and ht in (I × J)t s.t. IPp,σ(ht) > 0. For (it+1, jt+1) in I × J ,
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one has:
pkt+1(ht, it+1, jt+1) = IP (k˜ = k|ht, it+1)
=
IP (k˜ = k|ht)IP (it+1|k, ht)
IP (it+1|ht)
=
pkt (ht)σ
1
t+1(k, ht)(it+1)
σ¯1t+1(ht)(it+1)
.
Consequently,
IE (‖pt+1 − pt‖|ht) =
∑
it+1∈I
σ¯1t+1(ht)(it+1)
∑
k∈K
|pkt+1(ht, it+1)− pkt (ht)|.
=
∑
it+1∈I
∑
k∈K
|pkt (ht)σ1t+1(k, ht)(it+1)− σ¯1t+1(ht)(it+1)pkt (ht)|
=
∑
k∈K
pkt (ht)‖σ1t+1(k, ht)− σ¯1t+1(ht)‖
= IE
(
‖σ1t+1(k˜, ht)− σ¯1t+1(ht)‖|ht
)
.

We can now control payoffs. For t ≥ 0 and ht in (I × J)t:
IE
(
Gk˜ (˜it+1, j˜t+1)|ht
)
=
∑
k∈K
pkt (ht)G
k(σ1t+1(k, ht), σ
2
t+1(ht))
≤
∑
k∈K
pkt (ht)G
k(σ¯1t+1(ht), σ
2
t+1(ht))
+M
∑
k∈K
pkt (ht)‖σ1t+1(k, ht)− σ¯1t+1(ht)‖
≤ u(pt(ht)) +M
∑
k∈K
pkt (ht)‖σ1t+1(k, ht)− σ¯1t+1(ht)‖,
where u(pt(ht)) comes from the definition of σ
2. By lemma 5, we get:
IE
(
Gk˜(˜it+1, j˜t+1)|ht
)
≤ u(pt(ht)) +MIE (‖pt+1 − pt‖|ht) .
Applying Jensen’s inequality yields:
IE
(
Gk˜(˜it+1, j˜t+1)
)
≤ cavu(p) +MIE (‖pt+1 − pt‖) .
We now apply lemma 4 and obtain:
γ1,pT (σ
1, σ2) = IE
(
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
Gk˜(˜it+1, j˜t+1)
)
≤ cavu(p) + M√
T
∑
k∈K
√
pk(1− pk).
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This is true for any strategy σ1 of player 1. Considering the case of an optimal
strategy for player 1 in the T -stage game ΓT (p), we have shown:
Proposition 3. For p in ∆(K) and T ≥ 1,
vT (p) ≤ cavu(p) +
M
∑
k∈K
√
pk(1− pk)√
T
.
It remains to conclude about the existence of the uniform value. We have
seen that player 1 can guarantee cavu(p), that player 2 can guarantee limTvT (p),
and we obtain from proposition 3 that limTvT (p) ≤ cavu(p). This is enough to
deduce Aumann and Maschler’s celebrated “cavu” theorem.
Theorem 1 (Aumann and Maschler [87]). The game Γ(p) has a uniform value
which is cavu(p).
III.5 T -stage values and the recursive formula
As the T -stage game is a zero-sum game with incomplete information where
player 1 is informed, we can write:
vT (p) = inf
σ2∈Σ2
sup
σ1∈Σ1
γ1,pT (σ),
= inf
σ2∈Σ2
sup
σ1∈Σ1
∑
k∈K
pkγ1,δkT (σ),
= inf
σ2∈Σ2
∑
k∈K
pk
(
sup
σ1∈Σ1
γ1,δkT (σ)
)
.
This shows that vT is the infimum of a family of affine functions of p, hence is a
concave function of p. This concavity represents the advantage of player 1 to pos-
sess the information on the selected state. Clearly, we have vT (p) ≥ u(p), hence
we get the inequalities: ∀T ≥ 1, cavu(p) ≤ vT (p) ≤ cavu(p) + M
P
k∈K
√
pk(1−pk)√
T
.
It is also easy to prove that the T -stage value functions satisfy the following
recursive formula:
vT+1(p) =
1
T + 1
max
x∈∆(I)K
min
y∈∆(J)
(
G(p, x, y) + T
∑
i∈I
x(p)(i)vT (pˆ(x, i))
)
,
=
1
T + 1
min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)K
(
G(p, x, y) + T
∑
i∈I
x(p)(i)vT (pˆ(x, i))
)
,
where x = (xk(i))i∈I,k∈K, with xk the mixed action used at stage 1 by player 1 if
the state is k, G(p, x, y) =
∑
k,i,j p
kGk(xk(i), y(j)) is the expected payoff of stage
1, x(p)(i) =
∑
k∈K p
kxk(i) is the probability that action i is played at stage 1,
and pˆ(x, i) is the conditional probability on K given i.
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The next property interprets easily: the advantage of the informed player can
only decrease as the number of stages increases (for a proof, one can show that
vT+1 ≤ vT by induction on T , using the concavity of vT ).
Lemma 6. The T -stage value vT (p) is non increasing in T .
IV. Vector Payoffs and Approachability
The following model has been introduced by D. Blackwell ([7]) and is, strictly
speaking, not part of the general definition given in section I. We still have a
family of I × J matrices (Gk)k∈K, where K is a finite set of parameters. At each
stage t, simultaneously player 1 chooses it ∈ I and player 2 chooses jt ∈ J , and
the stage “payoff” is the full vector G(it, jt) = (G
k(it, jt))k∈K in IRK. Notice that
there is no initial probability or true state of nature here, and both players have
a symmetric role. We assume here that after each stage both players observe
exactly the stage vector payoff (but one can check that assuming that the action
profiles are observed wouldn’t change the results). A natural question is then to
determine the sets C in IRK such that player 1 (for example) can force the average
long term payoff to belong to C? Such sets will be called approachable by player 1.
In section IV, we use Euclidean distances and norms. Denote by F = {(Gk(i, j))k∈K, i ∈
I, j ∈ J} the finite set of possible stage payoffs, and by M a constant such that
‖u‖ ≤ M for each u in F . A strategy for player 1, resp. player 2, is an element
σ = (σt)t≥1, where σt maps F t−1 into ∆(I), resp. ∆(J). Strategy spaces for
player 1 and 2 are respectively denoted by Σ and T . A strategy profile (σ, τ)
naturally induces a unique probability on (I × J × F )∞ denoted by IPσ,τ . Let
C be a “target” set, that will always be assumed, without loss of generality, a
closed subset of IRK. We denote by gt the random variable, with value in F , of the
payoff of stage t, and we use g¯t =
1
t
∑t
t′=1 gt′ ∈ conv (F ), and finally dt = d(g¯t, C)
for the distance from g¯t to C.
Definition 3: C is approachable by player 1 if : ∀ε > 0, ∃σ ∈ Σ, ∃T, ∀τ ∈
T , ∀t ≥ T, IEσ,τ (dt) ≤ ε. C is excludable by player 1 if there exist δ > 0 such that
{z ∈ IRK, d(z, C) ≥ δ} is approachable by player 1.
Approachability and excludability for player 2 are defined similarly. C is ap-
proachable by player 1 if for each ε > 0, this player can force that for t large we
have IEσ,τ (dt) ≤ ε, so the average payoff will be ε-close to C with high probabil-
ity. A set cannot be approachable by a player as well as excludable by the other
player. In the usual case where K is a singleton, we are in dimension 1 and the
Minmax theorem implies that for each t, the interval [t,+∞[ is either approach-
able by player 1, or excludable by player 2, depending on the comparison between
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t and the value maxx∈∆(I) miny∈∆(J) G(x, y) = miny∈∆(J) maxx∈∆(I)G(x, y).
IV.1. Necessary and sufficient conditions for Approachability
Given a mixed action x in ∆(I), we write xG for the set of possible vector pay-
offs when player 1 uses x, i.e. xG = {G(x, y), y ∈ ∆(J)}= conv {∑i∈I xiG(i, j), j ∈
J}. Similarly, we write Gy = {G(x, y), x ∈ ∆(I)} for y in ∆(J).
Definition 4: The set C is a B(lackwell)-set for player 1 if for every z /∈ C,
there exists z′ ∈ C and x ∈ ∆(I) such that: (i) ‖z′ − z‖ = d(z, C), and (ii) the
hyperplane containing z′ and orthogonal to [z, z′] separates z from xG.
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Figure 3: The Blackwell property.
For example, any set xG, with x in ∆(I), is a B-set for player 1. Given a B-
set for player 1, we now construct a strategy σ adapted to C as follows. At each
positive stage t + 1, player 1 considers the current average payoff g¯t. If g¯t ∈ C,
or if t = 0, σ plays arbitrarily at stage t + 1. Otherwise, σ plays at stage t+ 1 a
mixed action x satisfying the previous definition for z = g¯t.
Theorem 2 If C is a B-set for player 1, a strategy σ adapted to C satisfies:
∀τ ∈ T , ∀t ≥ 1 IEσ,τ (dt) ≤ 2M√
t
and dt −→t→∞ 0 IPσ,τ a.s.
As an illustration, in dimension 1 and for C = {0}, this theorem implies that
a bounded sequence (xt)t of reals, such that the product xT+1
(
1
T
∑T
t=1 xT
)
is
non-positive for each T , Cesaro converges to zero.
Proof: Assume that player 1 plays σ adapted to C, whereas player 2 plays some
strategy τ . Fix t ≥ 1, and assume that g¯t /∈ C. Consider z′ ∈ C and x ∈ ∆(I)
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satisfying (i) and (ii) of definition 4 for z = g¯t. We have:
d2t+1 = d(g¯t+1, C)
2 ≤ ‖g¯t+1 − z′‖2
= ‖ 1
t+ 1
t+1∑
l=1
gl − z′‖
2
= ‖ 1
t+ 1
(gt+1 − z′) + t
t + 1
(g¯t − z′)‖
2
=
(
1
t + 1
)2
‖gt+1 − z′‖2 +
(
t
t+ 1
)2
dt
2
+
2t
(t+ 1)2
< gt+1 − z′, g¯t − z′ > .
By hypothesis, the expectation, given the first t action profiles ht ∈ (I×J)t, of the
above scalar product is non-positive, so IE
(
d2t+1|ht
) ≤ ( t
t+1
)
2
dt
2+( 1
t+1
)
2
IE (‖gt+1 − z′‖2|ht) .
Since IE (‖gt+1 − z′‖2|ht) ≤ IE
(‖gt+1 − g¯t‖2|ht) ≤ (2M)2, we have:
IE
(
d2t+1|ht
) ≤ ( t
t+ 1
)
2
dt
2 + (
1
t + 1
)
2
4M2. (2)
Taking the expectation, we get, whether g¯t /∈ C or not: ∀t ≥ 1, IE
(
d2t+1
) ≤
( t
t+1
)
2
IE(dt
2)+ ( 1
t+1
)
2
4M2. By induction, we obtain that for each t ≥ 1, IE(d2t ) ≤
4M2
t
, and IE(dt) ≤ 2M√t .
Put now, as in Sorin 2002 ([92]), et = d
2
t +
∑
t′>t
4M2
t′2
. Inequality (2) gives
IE(et+1|ht) ≤ et, so (et) is a non-negative supermartingale which expectation goes
to zero. By a standard probability result, we obtain et −→t→∞ 0 IPσ,τ a.s., and
finally dt −→t→∞ 0 IPσ,τ a.s. 
This theorem implies that any B-set for player 1 is approachable by this
player. The converse is true for convex sets.
Theorem 3 Let C be a closed convex subset of IRK.
(i) C is a B-set for player 1,
⇔ (ii) ∀y ∈ ∆(J), Gy ∩ C 6= ∅,
⇔ (iii) C is approachable by player 1,
⇔ (iv) ∀q ∈ IRK, max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
∑
k∈K
qkGk(x, y) ≥ inf
c∈C
< q, c > .
Proof: The implication (i) =⇒ (iii) comes from theorem 2. Proof of (iii) =⇒
(ii): assume there exists y ∈ ∆(J) such that Gy∩C = ∅. Since Gy is approachable
by player 2, then C is excludable by player 2 and thus C is not approachable by
player 1. Proof of (ii) =⇒ (i): Assume that Gy ∩ C 6= ∅ ∀y ∈ ∆(J). Consider
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z /∈ C and define z′ as its projection onto C. Define the matrix game where payoffs
are projected towards the direction z′−z, i.e. the matrix game∑k∈K(z′k−zk)Gk.
By assumption, one has: ∀y ∈ ∆(J), ∃x ∈ ∆(I) such that G(x, y) ∈ C, hence
such that:
< z′ − z, G(x, y) > ≥ minc∈C < z′ − z, c >=< z′ − z, z′ > .
So miny∈∆(J) maxx∈∆(I) < z′ − z, G(x, y) > ≥ < z′ − z, z′ >. By the minmax
theorem, there exists x in ∆(I) such that ∀y ∈ ∆(J), < z′ − z, G(x, y) >≥<
z′ − z, z′ >, that is < z′ − z, z′ −G(x, y) >≤ 0.
(iv) means that any half-space containing C is approachable by player 1.
(iii) =⇒ (iv) is thus clear. (iv) =⇒ (i) is similar to (ii) =⇒ (i). 
Up to minor formulation differences, theorems 2 and 3 are due to Blackwell
([7]). More recently, X. Spinat ([82]) has proved the following characterization.
Theorem 4 A closed set is approachable for player 1 if and only if it contains a
B-set for player 1.
As a consequence, it shows that adding the condition dt −→t→∞ 0 IPσ,τa.s.
in the definition of approachability does not modify the notion.
IV.2. Approachability for player 1 versus Excludability for player 2
As a corollary of theorem 3, we obtain that: A closed convex set in IRK is
either approachable by player 1, or excludable by player 2.
One can show that when K is a singleton, then any set is either approachable
by player 1, or excludable by player 2. A simple example of a set which is neither
approachable for player 1 nor excludable by player 2 is given in dimension 2 by:
G =
(
(0, 0) (0, 0)
(1, 0) (1, 1)
)
, and C = {(1/2, v), 0 ≤ v ≤ 1/4}⋃{(1, v), 1/4 ≤ v ≤ 1}
(see [92]).
IV.3. Weak Approachability
On can weaken the definition of approachability by giving up time uniformity.
Definition 5: C is weakly approachable by player 1 if: ∀ε > 0, ∃T, ∀t ≥ T, ∃σ ∈
Σ, ∀τ ∈ T , IEσ,τ (dt) ≤ ε. C is weakly excludable by player 1 if there exists δ > 0
such that {z ∈ IRK, d(z, C) ≥ δ} is weakly approachable by player 1.
N. Vieille ([83]) has proved, via the consideration of certain differential games:
Theorem 5 A subset of IRK is either weakly approachable by player 1 or weakly
excludable by player 2.
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IV.4. Back to the standard model
Let us come back to Aumann and Maschler’s model with a finite family of ma-
trices (Gk)k∈K, and an initial probability p on ∆(K). By theorem 1, the repeated
game Γ(p) has a uniform value which is cavu(p), and Blackwell approachability
will allow for the construction of an explicit optimal strategy for the uninformed
player. Considering a hyperplane which is tangent to cavu at p, we can find a
vector l in IRK such that
< l, p >= cavu(p) and ∀q ∈ ∆(K), < l, q >≥ cavu(q) ≥ u(q).
Define now the orthant C = {z ∈ IRK, zk ≤ lk ∀k ∈ K}. Recall that player 2
does not know the selected state, and an optimal strategy for him can not depend
on player 1’ strategy, and consequently on a martingale of a posteriori. He will
play in a way such that player 1’s long term payoff is, simultaneously for each k
in K, not greater than lk if the state is k.
Fix q = (qk)k in IR
K. If there exists k with qk > 0, we clearly have infc∈C <
q, c > = −∞ ≤ maxy∈∆(J) minx∈∆(I)
∑
k∈K q
kGk(x, y). Assume now that qk ≤ 0
for each k, with q 6= 0. Write s = ∑k(−qk).
inf
c∈C
< q, c > =
∑
k∈K
qklk
= −s < l, −q
s
>
≤ −s u(−q
s
)
≤ −s max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
∑
k∈K
−qk
s
Gk(x, y)
= max
y∈∆(J)
min
x∈∆(I)
∑
k∈K
qkGk(x, y)
This is condition (iv) of theorem 3, adapted to player 2. So C is a B-set for
player 2, and a strategy τ adapted to C satisfies by theorem 2: ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∀k ∈ K,
IEσ,τ
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Gk (˜it, j˜t)− lk
)
≤ IEσ,τ
(
d
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Gk(˜it, j˜t), C
))
≤ 2M√
T
,
(whereM is here an upper bound for the Euclidean norms of the vectors (Gk(i, j))k∈K,
with i ∈ I and j ∈ J .) So,
γ1,pT (σ, τ) =
∑
k∈K
pk
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
IEσ,τ (G
k (˜it, j˜t))
)
≤ < p, l > +2M√
T
= cavu(p) +
2M√
T
.
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As shown by Kohlberg ([34]), the approachability strategy τ is thus an optimal
strategy for player 2 in the repeated game Γ(p).
V. Zero-sum games with lack of information on
both sides
The following model has also been introduced by Aumann and Maschler ([87]).
We are still in the context of zero-sum repeated games with observable actions,
but it is no longer assumed that one of the players is fully informed. The set of
states is here a product K × L of finite sets, and we have a family of matrices
(Gk,l)(k,l)∈K×Lwith size I × J , as well as initial probabilities p on K, and q on
L. In the game Γ(p, q), a state of nature (k, l) is first selected according to the
product probability p⊗ q, then k, resp. l, is announced to player 1, resp. player
2 only. Then the matrix game Gk,l is repeated over and over: at every stage,
simultaneously player 1 chooses a row i in I, whereas player 2 chooses a column
j in J , the stage payoff for player 1 is Gk,l(i, j) but only i and j are publicly
announced before proceeding to the next stage.
The average payoff for player 1 in the T -stage game is written: γ1,p,qT (σ
1, σ2) =
IEp,qσ1,σ2
(
1
T
∑T
t=1 G
k˜,l˜(˜it, j˜t)
)
, and the T -stage value is written vT (p, q). Similarly,
the λ-discounted value of the game will be written vλ(p, q)
The non revealing game now corresponds to the case where player 1 plays
independently of k and player 2 plays independently of l. Its value is denoted by:
u(p, q) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
∑
k,l
pkqlGk,l(x, y). (3)
Given a continuous function f : ∆(K) × ∆(L) −→ IR, we denote by cavI f
the concavification of f with respect to the first variable: for each (p, q) in
∆(K)×∆(L), cavI f(p, q) is the value at p of the smallest concave function from
∆(K) to IR which is above f(., q). Similarly, we denote by vexII f the convexifi-
cation of f with respect to the second variable. It can be shown that cavI f and
vexII f are continuous, and we can compose cavI vexII f and vexII cavI f . These
functions are both concave in the first variable and convex in the second variable,
and they satisfy cavI vexII f(p, q) ≤ vexII cavI f(p, q).
V.1. Maxmin and Minmax of the repeated game
Theorem 1 generalizes as follows.
Theorem 6 ([87]) In the repeated game Γ(p, q), the greatest quantity which can
be guaranteed by player 1 is cavI vexII u(p, q), and the smallest quantity which
can be guaranteed by player 2 is vexII cavI u(p, q).
Aumann, Maschler and Stearns also showed that cavI vexII u(p, q) can be de-
fended by player 2, uniformly in time, i.e. that ∀ε > 0, ∀σ1, ∃T0, ∃σ2, ∀T ≥
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T0, γ
p,q
T (σ
1, σ2) ≤ cavI vexII u(p, q)v + ε. Similarly, vexII cavI u(p, q) can be de-
fended by player 1.
The proof uses the martingales of a posteriori of each player, and a useful no-
tion is that of the informational content of a strategy: for a strategy σ1 of the first
player, it is defined as: I(σ1) = supσ2 IE
p,q
σ1,σ2
(∑
k∈K
∑∞
t=0
(
pkt+1(σ
1)− pkt (σ1)
)2)
,
where pt(σ
1) is the a posteriori on K of player 2 after stage t given that player
1 uses σ1. By linearity of the expectation, the supremum can be restricted to
strategies of player 2 which are both pure and independent of l.
Theorem 6 implies that cavI vexII u(p, q) = supσ1∈Σ1 lim infT
(
infσ2∈Σ2 γ
1,p,q
T (σ
1, σ2)
)
,
and cavI vexII u(p, q) is called the maxmin of the repeated game Γ(p, q). Similarly,
vexII cavI u(p, q) = infσ2∈Σ2 lim supT (supσ1∈Σ1 γ
1
T (σ
1, σ2)) is called the minmax of
Γ(p, q). As a corollary, we obtain that the repeated game Γ(p, q) has a uniform
value if and only if: cavI vexII u(p, q) = vexII cavI u(p, q). This is not always the
case, and there exist counter-examples to the existence of the uniform value.
Example 4: K = {a, a′}, and L = {b, b′}, with p and q uniform.
Ga,b =
(
0 0 0 0
−1 1 1 −1
)
Ga,b
′
=
(
1 −1 1 −1
0 0 0 0
)
Ga
′,b =
( −1 1 −1 1
0 0 0 0
)
Ga
′,b′ =
(
0 0 0 0
1 −1 −1 1
)
Mertens and Zamir ([51]) have shown that here, cavI vexII u(p, q) = −14 < 0 =
vexII cavI u(p, q).
V.2. Limit values
It is easy to see that for each T and λ, the value functions vT and vλ are
concave in the first variable, and convex in the second variable. They are all Lip-
schitz functions, with the same constant M = maxi,j,k,l |Gk,l(i, j)|, and here also,
recursive formulae can be given. In the following result, vT and vλ are viewed as
elements of the set C of continuous mappings from ∆(K)×∆(L) to IR.
Theorem 7 (Mertens and Zamir ([51]) (vT )T , as T goes to infinity, and
(vλ)λ, as λ goes to zero, both uniformly converge to the unique solution f of the
following system: {
f = vexII max{u, f}
f = cavI min{u, f}
The above system can be fruitfully studied without reference to repeated
games (see [54], [78], [38], [39]).
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Remark: Let U be the set of all non revealing value functions, i.e. of functions
from ∆(K) × ∆(L) to IR satisfying equation (3) for some family of matrices
(Gk,l)k,l. One can easily show that any mapping in C is a uniform limit of ele-
ments in U .
V.3. Correlated initial information
A more general model can be written, where it is no longer assumed that
the initial information of the players are independent. The set of states is now
denoted by R (instead of K × L), initially a state r in R is chosen according to
a known probability p = (pr)r∈R, and each player receives a deterministic signal
depending on r. Equivalently, each player i has a partition Ri of R and observes
the element of his partition which contains the selected state.
After the first stage, player 1 will play an action x = (xr)r∈R which is mea-
surable with respect to R1, i.e. (r −→ xr) is constant on each atom of R1. After
having observed player 1’s action at the first stage, the conditional probability
on R necessarily belongs to the set:
ΠI(p) =
{
(αrpr)r∈R , ∀r αr ≥ 0,
∑
r
αrpr = 1 and (αr)r is R
1-measurable
}
.
ΠI(p) contains p, and is a convex compact subset of ∆(R). A mapping f from
∆(R) to IR is now said to be I-concave if for each p in ∆(R), the restriction of
f to ΠI(p) is concave. And given g : ∆(R) −→ IR which is bounded from above,
we define the concavification cavI g as the smallest function above g which is I-
concave. Similarly one can define the set ΠII(p) and the notions of II-convexity
and II-convexification. With these generalized definitions, the results of theorem
6 and 7 perfectly extend ([51]).
VI. Non zero-sum games with lack of information
on one side
We now consider the generalization of the standard model of section III to
the non-zero sum case. Hence two players infinitely repeat the same bimatrix
game, with player 1 only knowing the bimatrix. Formally, we have a finite set
of states K, an initial probability p on K, and families of I × J-payoff matrices
(Ak)k∈K and (Bk)k∈K. Initially, a state k in K is selected according to p, and
announced to player 1 only. Then the bimatrix game (Ak, Bk) is repeated over
and over: at every stage, simultaneously player 1 chooses a row i in I, whereas
player 2 chooses a column j in J , the stage payoff for player 1 is then Ak(i, j),
the stage payoff for player 2 is Bk(i, j), but only i and j are publicly announced
before proceeding to the next stage. Without loss of generality, we assume that
pk > 0 for each k, and that each player has at least 2 actions.
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Given a strategy pair (σ1, σ2), it is here convenient to denote the expected
payoffs up to stage T by:
αpT (σ
1, σ2) = IEp,σ1,σ2
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ak˜ (˜it, j˜t)
)
=
∑
k∈K
pkαkT (σ
1, σ2).
βpT (σ
1, σ2) = IEp,σ1,σ2
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Bk˜ (˜it, j˜t)
)
=
∑
k∈K
pkβkT (σ
1, σ2).
Given a probability q on K, we write A(q) =
∑
k q
kAk, B(q) =
∑
k q
kBk,
u(q) = maxx∈∆(I) miny∈∆(J) A(q)(x, y) and v(q) = maxy∈∆(J) minx∈∆(I)B(q)(x, y).
If γ = (γ(i, j))(i,j)∈I×J ∈ ∆(I × J), we put A(q)(γ) =
∑
(i,j)∈I×J γ(i, j)A(q)(i, j)
and similarly B(q)(γ) =
∑
(i,j)∈I×J γ(i, j)B(q)(i, j).
VI.1 Existence of Equilibria
The question of existence of an equilibrium has remained unsolved for long.
Sorin ([76]) proved the existence of an equilibrium for two states of nature, and
the general case has been solved by Simon et al. ([73]).
Exactly as in the zero-sum case, a strategy pair σ induces a sequence of a
posteriori (pt(σ))t≥0 which is a IPp,σ- martingale with values in ∆(K). We will
concentrate on the cases where this martingale moves only once.
Definition 6: A joint plan is a triple (S, λ, γ), where:
- S is a finite non empty set (of messages),
- λ = (λk)k∈K (signalling strategy) with for each k, λk ∈ ∆(S) and for each
s, λs =def
∑
k∈K p
kλks > 0,
- γ = (γs)s∈S (contract) with for each s, γs ∈ ∆(I × J).
The idea is due to Aumann, Maschler and Stearns. Player 1 observes k, then
chooses s ∈ S according to λk and announces s to player 2. Then the players
play pure actions corresponding to the frequencies γs(i, j), for i in I and j in J .
Given a joint plan (S, λ, γ), we define:
- ∀s ∈ S, ps = (pks)k∈K ∈ ∆(K), with pks = p
kλks
λs
for each k. ps is the a
posteriori on K given s.
- ϕ = (ϕk)k∈K ∈ IRK, with for each k, ϕk = maxs∈S Ak(γs).
- ∀s ∈ S, ψs = B(ps)(γs) and ψ =
∑
k∈K p
k
∑
s∈S λ
k
sB
k(γs) =
∑
s∈S λsψs.
Definition 7: A joint plan (S, λ, γ) is an equilibrium joint plan if:
(i) ∀s ∈ S, ψs ≥ vexv(ps),
(ii) ∀k ∈ K, ∀s ∈ S s.t. pks > 0, Ak(γs) = ϕk, and
(iii) ∀q ∈ ∆(K), < ϕ, q > ≥ u(q).
21
Condition (ii) can be seen as an incentive condition for player 1 to choose s
according to λk. Given an equilibrium joint plan (S, λ, γ), one define a strategy
pair (σ1∗, σ2∗) adapted to it. For each message s, first fix a sequence (ist , j
s
t )t≥1 of
elements in I × J such that for each (i, j), the empirical frequencies converge to
the corresponding probability: 1
T
|{t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, (ist , jst ) = (i, j)}| −→T→∞ γs(i, j).
We also fix an injective mapping f from S to I l, where l is large enough, cor-
responding to a code between the players to announce an element in S. σ1∗ is
precisely defined as follows. Player 1 observes the selected state k, then chooses s
according to λk, and announces s to player 2 by playing f(s) at the first l stages.
Finally, σ1∗ plays ist at each stage t > l as long as player 2 plays j
s
t . If at some stage
t > l player 2 does not play jst then player 1 punishes his opponent by playing
an optimal strategy in the zero-sum game with initial probability ps and payoffs
for player 1 given by (−Bk)k∈K. We now define σ2∗. Player 2 arbitrarily plays at
the beginning of the game, then compute at the end of stage l the message s sent
by player 1. Next he plays at each stage t > l the action jst as long as player 1
plays ist . If at some stage t > l, player 1 does not play i
s
t , or if the first l actions
of player 1 correspond to no message, then player 2 plays a punishing strategy σ¯2
such that : ∀ε > 0, ∃T0, ∀T ≥ T0, ∀σ1 ∈ Σ1, ∀k ∈ K,αkT (σ1, σ¯2) ≤ ϕk + ε. Such a
strategy σ¯2 exists because of condition (iii): it is an approachability strategy for
player 2 of the orthant {x ∈ IRK , ∀k ∈ K xk ≤ ϕk} (see section IV.4).
Lemma 7 ([76]): A strategy pair adapted to an equilibrium joint plan is a uni-
form equilibrium of the repeated game.
Proof: The payoffs induced by (σ1∗, σ2∗) can be easily computed: ∀k, αkT (σ1∗, σ2∗)
−→T→∞
∑
s∈S λ
k
sA
k(γs) = ϕ
k because of (ii), and βpT (σ
1∗, σ2∗)−→T→∞
∑
k∈K p
k
∑
s∈S λ
k
sB
k(γs) =
ψ. Assume that player 2 plays σ2∗. The existence of σ¯2 implies that no detectable
deviation of player 1 is profitable, so if the state is k, player 1 will gain no more
than maxs′∈S Ak(γs′). But this is just ϕk. The proof can be made uniform in σ1
and we obtain: ∀ε > 0 ∃T0 ∀T ≥ T0, ∀k ∈ K, ∀σ1 ∈ Σ1, αkT (σ1, σ2∗) ≤ ϕk + ε.
Finally assume that player 1 plays σ1∗. Condition (i) implies that if player 2
uses σ2∗, the payoff of this player will be at least vex v(ps) if the message is s.
Since vex v(ps) (= −cav(−v(ps))) is the value, from the point of view of player
2 with payoffs (Bk)k, of the zero-sum game with initial probability ps, player 2
fears the punition by player 1, and ∀ε > 0, ∃T0, ∀T ≥ T0, ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2, βpT (σ1∗, σ2) ≤∑
s∈S λsψs + ε = ψ + ε. 
To prove the existence of equilibria, we then look for equilibrium joint plans.
The first idea is to consider, for each probability r on K, the set of payoff vectors
ϕ compatible with r being an a posteriori. This leads to the consideration of the
following correspondence (for each r, Φ(r) is a subset of IRK):
Φ : ∆(K) ⇒ IRK
r 7→ {(Ak(γ))k∈K, where γ ∈ ∆(I × J) satisfies B(r)(γ) ≥ vex v(r)}
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It is easy to see that the graph of Φ, i.e. the set {(r, ϕ) ∈ ∆(K)×IRK , ϕ ∈ Φ(r)},
is compact, that Φ has non empty convex values, and satisfies: ∀r ∈ ∆(K), ∀q ∈
∆(K), ∃ϕ ∈ Φ(r), < ϕ, q > ≥ u(q).
Assume now that one can find a finite family (ps)s∈S of probabilities on K, as
well as vectors ϕ and, for each s, ϕs in IR
K such that: 1) p ∈ conv {ps, s ∈ S},
2) < ϕ, q > ≥ u(q) ∀q ∈ ∆(K), 3) ∀s ∈ S, ϕs ∈ Φ(ps), and 4) ∀s ∈ S, ∀k ∈ K,
ϕks ≤ ϕk with equality if pks > 0. It is then easy to construct an equilibrium joint
plan. Thus we get interested in proving the following result.
Proposition 4: Let p be in ∆(K), u : ∆(K) −→ IR be a continuous mapping,
and Φ : ∆(K) ⇒ IRK be a correspondence with compact graph and non empty
convex values such that: ∀r ∈ ∆(K), ∀q ∈ ∆(K), ∃ϕ ∈ Φ(r), < ϕ, q > ≥ u(q).
Then there exists a finite family (ps)s∈S of elements of ∆(K), as well as vectors
ϕ and, for each s, ϕs in IR
K such that:
- p ∈ conv {ps, s ∈ S},
- < ϕ, q > ≥ u(q) ∀q ∈ ∆(K),
- ∀s ∈ S, ϕs ∈ Φ(ps),
- ∀s ∈ S, ∀k ∈ K, ϕks ≤ ϕk with equality if pks > 0.
The proof of proposition 4 relies, as explained in [59] or [72], on a fixed point
theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type proved by Simon, Spiez˙ and Torun´czyk ([73]) via
tools from algebraic geometry. A simplified version of this fixed point theorem
can be written as follows:
Theorem 8 ([73]): Let C be a compact subset of an n-dimensional Euclidean
space, x ∈ C and Y be a finite union of affine subspaces of dimension n− 1 of an
Euclidean space. Let F be a correspondence from C to Y with compact graph
and non empty convex values. Then there exists L ⊂ ∂C and y ∈ Y such that:
∀l ∈ L, y ∈ F (l) and x ∈ conv (L).
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Figure 4: A Borsuk-Ulam type theorem by Simon, Spiez˙ and Torun´czyk.
Notice that for n = 1 (corresponding to 2 states of nature), the image by F
of the connected component of C containing x necessarily is a singleton, hence
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the result is clear. In the general case, one finally obtains:
Theorem 9 ([73]): There exists an equilibrium joint plan. Thus there exists a
uniform equilibrium in the repeated game Γ(p).
VI.2 Characterization of equilibrium payoffs
Characterizing equilibrium payoffs, as the Folk theorem does for repeated
games with complete information, has been a challenging problem. We denote
here by p0 the initial probability in the interior of ∆(K). We are interested in
the set of equilibrium payoffs, in the convenient following sense:
Definition 8: A vector (a, b) in IRK × IR is called an equilibrium payoff of the
repeated game Γ(p0) if there exists a strategy pair (σ
1∗, σ2∗) satisfying:
(i) ∀ε > 0 ∃T0 ∀T ≥ T0, ∀k ∈ K, ∀σ1 ∈ Σ1, αkT (σ1, σ2∗) ≤ αkT (σ1∗, σ2∗) + ε,
∀ε > 0 ∃T0 ∀T ≥ T0, ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2, βp0T (σ1∗, σ2) ≤ βpT (σ1∗, σ2∗) + ε, and
(ii) (αkT (σ
1∗, σ2∗))k,T and (β
p0
T (σ
1∗, σ2∗))T respectively converge to a and b.
Since p lies in the interior of ∆(K), the first line of (i) is equivalent to: ∀ε >
0 ∃T0 ∀T ≥ T0, ∀σ1 ∈ Σ1, αpT (σ1, σ2∗) ≤ αpT (σ1∗, σ2∗) + ε. The strategy pair
(σ1∗, σ2∗) is thus a uniform equilibrium of the repeated game, with the additional
requirement that expected average payoffs of player 1 converge in each state k.
In some sense, player 1 is viewed here as |K| different types or players, and we
require the existence of the limit payoff of each type. We will only consider such
uniform equilibria in the sequel.
Notice that the above definition implies: ∀k ∈ K , ∀ε > 0, ∃T0, ∀T ≥ T0,
∀σ1 ∈ Σ1, αkT (σ1, σ2∗) ≤ ak + ε. So the orthant {x ∈ IRK, xk ≤ ak ∀k ∈ K} is
approachable by player 2, and by theorem 3 and subsection IV.4 one can obtain
that:
< a, q > ≥ u(q) ∀q ∈ ∆(K) (4)
Condition (4) is called the individual rationality condition for player 1, and does
not depend on the initial probability in the interior of ∆(K). Regarding player
2, we have: ∀ε > 0 ∃T0 ∀T ≥ T0, ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2, βp0T (σ1∗, σ2) ≤ β + ε, so by theorem
1:
β ≥ vex v(p0). (5)
Condition (5) is the individual rationality condition for player 2: at equilibrium,
this player should have at least the value of the game where player 1’s plays in
order to minimize player 2’s payoffs.
Imagine now that σ1∗ is a non revealing strategy for player 1, and that the
players play actions with empirical frequencies corresponding to a given prob-
ability distribution pi = (pii,j)(i,j)∈I×J ∈ ∆(I × J). We will have: ∀k ∈ K,
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ak =
∑
i,j pii,jA
k(i, j) and β =
∑
k p
k
0
∑
i,j pii,jB
k(i, j), and if the individual ratio-
nality conditions are satisfied, no detectable deviation of a player can be prof-
itable. This leads to the definition of the following set, where M is the constant
max{|Ak(i, j)|, |Bk(i, j)|, (i, j) ∈ I × J}, and IRM = [−M,M ].
Definition 9: Let G be the set of triples (a, β, p) ∈ IRKM×IRM×∆(K) satisfying:
1. ∀q ∈ ∆(K), < a, q >≥ u(q),
2. β ≥ vexv(p),
3. ∃pi ∈ ∆(I × J) s.t. β = ∑k pk∑i,j pii,jBk(i, j) and ∀k ∈ K, ak ≥∑
i,j pii,jA
k(i, j) with equality if pk > 0.
We need to considerate every possible initial probability because the main
state variable of the model is, here also, the belief, or a posteriori, of player 2 on
the state of nature. {(a, β), (a, β, p0) ∈ G} is the set of payoffs of non revealing
equilibria of Γ(p0). The importance of the following definition will appear with
theorem 10 below (which unfortunately has not led to a proof of existence of
equilibrium payoffs).
Definition 10: G∗ is defined as the set of elements g = (a, β, p) ∈ IRKM ×
IRM ×∆(K) such that there exist a probability space (Ω,A, Q), an increasing se-
quence (Fn)n≥1 of finite sub-σ-algebras of A, and a sequence of random variables
(gn)n≥1 = (an, βn, pn)n≥1 defined on (Ω,A) with values in IRKM × IRM × ∆(K)
satisfying: (i) g1 = g a.s., (ii) (gn)n≥1 is a martingale adapted to (Fn)n≥1, (iii)
∀n ≥ 1, an+1 = an a.s. or pn+1 = pn a.s., and (iv) (gn)n converges a.s. to a
random variable g∞ with values in G.
Let us forget for a while the component of player 2’s payoff. A process (gn)n
satisfying (ii) and (iii) may be called a bi-martingale, it is a martingale such that
at every stage, one of the two components remains a.s. constant. So the set G∗
can be seen as the set of starting points of converging bi-martingales with limit
points in G.
Theorem 10 (Hart, [28]) Let (a, β) be in IRK × IR.
(a, β) is an equilibrium payoff of Γ(p0) ⇐⇒ (a, β, p0) ∈ G∗.
Theorem 10 is too elaborate to be proved here, but let us give a few ideas
about the proof. First consider the implication =⇒, and fix an equilibrium σ∗ =
(σ1∗, σ2∗) of Γ(p0) with payoff (a, β). The sequence of a posteriori (pt(σ∗))t≥0 is a
IPp0,σ∗- martingale. Modify now slightly the time structure so that at each stage,
player 1 plays first, and then player 2 plays without knowing the action chosen
by player 1. At each half-stage where player 2 plays, his a posteriori remains
constant. At each half-stage where player 1 plays, the “expectation of player
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1’s future payoff” (which can be properly defined) remains constant. Hence, the
heuristic apparition of the bimartingale. And since bounded martingale converge,
for large stages everything will be fixed and the players will approximately play
a non revealing equilibrium at a “limit a posteriori ”, so the convergence will be
towards elements of G.
Consider now the converse implication⇐=. Let (a, β) be such that (a, β, p0) ∈
G∗, and assume for simplification that the associated bi-martingale (an, βn, pn)
converges in a fixed number N of stages: ∀n ≥ N, (an, βn, pn) = (aN , βN , pN) ∈ G.
One can construct an equilibrium (σ1∗, σ2∗) of Γ(p0) with payoff (a, β) along the
following lines. For each index n, (an, βn) will be an equilibrium payoff of the
repeated game with initial probability pn. Eventually, player 1 will play inde-
pendently of the state, the a posteriori of player 2 will be pN , and the players
will end up playing a non revealing equilibrium of the repeated game Γ(pN) with
payoff (aN , βN). What should be played before ? Since we are in an undiscounted
setup, any finite number of stages can be used for communication without influ-
encing payoffs. Let n < N be such that an+1 = an. To move from (an, βn, pn) to
(an, βn+1, pn+1), player 1 can simply use the splitting lemma (lemma 1) in order
to signal part of the state to player 2. Let now n < N be such that pn+1 = pn, so
that we want to move from (an, βn, pn) to (an+1, βn+1, pn). Player 1 will play in-
dependently of the state, and both players will act so as to convexify their future
payoffs. This convexification is done through procedures called “jointly controlled
lotteries” and introduced in the sixties by Aumann and Maschler ([87]), with the
following simple and brilliant idea. Imagine that the players have to decide with
even probability whether to play the equilibrium E1 with payoff (a1, β1) or to
play the equilibrium E2 with payoff (a2, β2). The players may not be indifferent
between E1 and E2, e.g. player 1 may prefer E1 whereas player 2 prefers E2.
They will proceed as follows, with i and i′, respectively j and j ′, denoting two
distinct actions of player 1, resp. player 2. Simultaneously and independently,
player 1 will select i or i′ with probability 1/2, whereas player 2 will behave sim-
ilarly with j and j ′.
j j ′
i
i′
( ×
×
)
. Then the equilibrium E1 will be played
if the diagonal has been reached, i.e. if (i, j) or (i′, j ′) has been played, and oth-
erwise the equilibrium E2 will be played. This procedure is robust to unilateral
deviations: none of the players can deviate and prevent E1 and E2 to be chosen
with probability 1/2. In general, jointly controlled lotteries are procedures allow-
ing to select an alternative among a finite set according to a given probability
(think of binary expansions if necessary), in a way which is robust to deviations
by a single player. S. Hart has precisely shown how to combine steps of signalling
and jointly controlled lotteries to construct an equilibrium of Γ∞(p0) with payoff
(a, β).
VI.3 Biconvexity and bimartingales
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The previous analysis has lead to the introduction and study of biconvexity
phenomena. The reference here is [4]. Let X and Y be compact convex subsets
of Euclidean spaces, and let (Ω,F ,P) be an atomless probability space.
Definition 11: A subset B of X × Y is biconvex if for every x in X and y in
Y , the sections Bx. = {y′ ∈ Y, (x, y′) ∈ B} and B.y = {x′ ∈ X, (x′, y) ∈ B} are
convex. If B is biconvex, a mapping f : B −→ IR is called biconvex if for each
(x, y) ∈ X × Y , f(., y) and f(x, .) are convex.
As in the usual convexity case, we have that if f is biconvex, then for each α
in IR, the set {(x, y) ∈ B, f(x, y) ≤ α} is biconvex.
Definition 12: A sequence of random variables Zn = (Xn, Yn)n≥1 with values in
X × Y is called a bimartingale if:
(1) there exists an increasing sequence (Fn)n≥1 of finite sub-σ-algebra of F
such that (Zn)n is a (Fn)n≥1-martingale.
(2) ∀n ≥ 1, Xn = Xn+1 a.s. or Yn = Yn+1 a.s.
(3) Z1 is a.s. constant.
Notice that (Zn)n≥1 being a bounded martingale, it converges almost surely
to a limit Z∞.
Definition 13: Let A be a measurable subset of X × Y .
A∗ = {z ∈ X × Y, there exists a bimartingale (Zn)n≥1 converging to a limit Z∞
such that Z∞ ∈ A a.s. and Z1 = z a.s. }.
One can show that any atomless probability space (Ω,F ,P), or any product
of convex compact spaces X × Y containing A, induce the same set A∗. One can
also substitute condition (2) by: ∀n ≥ 1, (Xn = Xn+1 orYn = Yn+1) a.s. Notice
that without condition (2), the set A∗ would just be the convex hull of A.
We always have A ⊂ A∗ ⊂ conv (A), and these inclusions can be strict. For
example, if X = Y = [0, 1] and A = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)}, it is possible to show
that A∗ = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], x = 0 or y = 0}. A∗ always is biconvex and thus
contains biconv (A), which is defined as the smallest biconvex set which contains
A. The inclusion biconv (A) ⊂ A∗ can also be strict, as shown by the following
example:
Example 5: Put X = Y = [0, 1], v1 = (1/3, 0), v2 = (0, 2/3), v3 = (2/3, 1), v4 =
(1, 1/3), w1 = (1/3, 1/3), w2 = (1/3, 2/3), w3 = (2/3, 2/3) et w4 = (2/3, 1/3),
and A = {v1, v2, v3, v4}.
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Figure 5: The “four frogs” example of Aumann and Hart: A∗ 6= biconv (A).
A is biconvex, so A = biconv (A). Consider now the following Markov pro-
cess (Zn)n≥1, with Z1 = w1. If Zn ∈ A, then Zn+1 = Zn. If Zn = wi for some i,
then Zn+1 = wi+1(mod 4) with probability 1/2, and Zn+1 = vi with probability 1/2.
(Zn)n is a bimartingale converging a.s. to a point in A, hence w1 ∈ A∗\biconv (A).
We now present a geometric characterization of the set A∗, and assume here
that A is closed. For each biconvex subset B of X × Y containing A, we denote
by nsc(B) the set of elements of B which can not be separated from A by a con-
tinuous bounded biconvex function on A. More precisely, nsc(B) = {z ∈ B, ∀f :
B −→ IR bounded biconvex, and continuous on A, f(z) ≤ sup{f(z ′), z′ ∈ A} }.
Theorem 11 ([4]): A∗ is the largest biconvex set B containing A such that
nsc(B) = B.
Let us now come back to repeated games and to the notations of subsection
VI.2. To be precise, we need to add the component of player 2’s payoff, and
consequently to slightly modify the definitions. G is closed in IRKM ×IRM ×∆(K).
For B ⊂ IRKM × IRM ×∆(K), B is biconvex if for each a in IRKM and for each p in
∆(K), the sections {(β, p′), (a, β, p′) ∈ B} and {(a′, β), (a′, β, p) ∈ B} are convex.
A real function f defined on a biconvex set B is said to be biconvex if ∀a, ∀p,
f(a, ., .) and f(., ., p) are convex.
Theorem 12 ([4]): G∗ is the largest biconvex set B containing G such that: ∀z ∈
B, ∀f : B −→ IR bounded biconvex, and continuous on A, f(z) ≤ sup{f(z ′), z′ ∈
G}.
VII. Non-observable actions
We now consider the case where, as in the general definition of section I, there
is a signalling function q : K×A −→ ∆(U) giving the distributions of the signals
received by the players as a function of the state of nature and the action profile
just played. The particular case where q(k, a) does not depend on k is called state
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independent signalling. The previous models correspond to the particular case of
perfect observation, where the signals received by the players exactly reveal the
action profile played.
Theorem 1 has been generalized ([87]) to the general case of signalling func-
tion. We keep the notations of section III. Given a mixed action x ∈ ∆(I), an
action j in J and a state k, we denote by Q(k, x, j) the marginal distribution on
U2 of the law
∑
i∈I x(i) q(k, i, j), i.e. Q(k, x, j) is the law of the signal received
by player 2 if the state is k, player 1 uses x and player 2 plays j. The set of non
revealing strategies of player 1 is then defined as: NR(p) =
{x = (xk)k∈K ∈ ∆(I)K, ∀k ∈ K, ∀k′ ∈ K s.t. pkpk′ > 0, ∀j ∈ J,Q(k, xk, j) = Q(k′, xk′, j)}.
If the initial probability is p and player 1 plays a strategy x in NR(p) (i.e. plays
xk if the state is k), the a posteriori of player 2 will remain a.s. constant: player 2
can deduce no information on the selected state k. The value of the non revealing
game becomes:
u(p) = max
x∈NR(p)
min
y∈∆(J)
∑
k∈K
pkGk(xk, y) = min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈NR(p)
∑
k∈K
pkGk(xk, y),
where Gk(xk, y) =
∑
i,j x
k(i)y(j)Gk(i, j), and the convention u(p) = −∞ if
NR(p) = ∅. Theorem 1 perfectly extends here: The repeated game with ini-
tial probability p has a uniform value given by cavu(p).
The explicit construction of an optimal strategy of player 2 (see IV.4 here)
has also been generalized to the general signalling case (see [34], and [91], part
B, p.234 for random signals).
Regarding zero-sum games with lack of information on both sides, the results
of section V have been generalized to the case of state independent signalling
(see [49], [51] and [54]). Attention has been paid to the speed of convergence
of the value function (vT )T , and bounds are identical for both models of lack
of information on one side and on both sides, if we assume state independent
signalling: this speed is of order 1/T 1/2 for games with perfect observation, and
of order 1/T 1/3 for games with signals (these orders are optimal, both for lack of
information on one side and lack of information on both sides, see [85], [86]). For
state dependent signalling and lack of information on one side, it was shown by
Mertens [50] that the convergence occurs with worst case error ∼ (lnn/n)1/3.
A particular class of zero-sum repeated games with state dependent signalling
has been studied (games with no signals, see [53], [84] and [79]). In these games,
the state k is first selected according to a known probability and is not announced
to the players; then after each stage both players receive the same signal which
is either “nothing” or “the state is k”. It was shown that the maxmin and the
minmax may differ, although limTvT always exists.
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In non zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on one side, the
existence of “joint plan” equilibria have been generalized to the case of state
independent signalling ([59]), and more generally to the case where “player 1
can send non revealing signals to player 2” ([74]). The existence of a uniform
equilibrium in the general signalling case is still an open question (see [75]).
VIII. Miscellaneous
VIII.1 Zero-sum games
In games with lack of information on one side, it is important that player 1
knows not only the selected state k, but also the a priori p. [81] provides an
example of a game with lack of information on “one and a half” side with no
uniform value. More precisely, in this example nature first chooses p in {p1, p2}
according to a known probability, and announces p to player 2 only; then k is
selected according to p, and announced to player 1 only; finally the matrix game
Gk is played.
For games with lack of information on one side, the value function vT is a
concave piecewise linear function of the initial probability p (see [58] for more
generality). On the contrary, the discounted value vλ can be quite a complex
function of p: in example 2 of section I, Mayberry ([48]) has proved that for
2/3 < λ < 1, vλ is, at each rational value of p, non differentiable.
Convergence of the value functions (vT )T and (vλ)λ have been widely studied.
We have already discussed the speed of convergence in section VII, but much
more can be said.
Example 6: Standard model of lack of information on one side and observable
actions. K = {a, b}, Ga =
(
3 −1
−3 1
)
and Gb =
(
2 −2
−2 2
)
. One can show
([52]) that for each p ∈ [0, 1], viewed as the initial probability of state a, the
sequence
√
T vT (p) converges to ϕ(p), where ϕ(p) =
1√
2pi
e−x
2
p/2, and xp satisfies
1√
2pi
∫ xp
−∞ e
−x2/2dx = p. So the limit of
√
T vT (p) is the standard normal density
function evaluated at its p-quantile.
The apparition of the normal distribution is by no way an isolated phe-
nomenon, but rather an important property of some repeated games ([11], [12],
[13], [17], [14], ...).
B. de Meyer introduced the notion of “dual game” (see the previous references
and also [66], [18], [40], [16]). Let us now illustrate this on the standard model of
section III.
Let z be a parameter in IRK. In the dual game Γ∗T (z), player 1 first secretly
chooses the state k. Then at each stage t ≤ T , the players choose as usual actions
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it and jt which are announced before proceeding to the next stage. With time
horizon T , player 1’s payoff finally is 1
T
∑T
t=1G
k(it, jt) − zk. This player is thus
now able to fix the state equal to k, but has to pay zk for it. It can be shown
that the T -stage dual game Γ∗T (z) has a value wT (z). wT is convex, and is linked
to the value of the primal game by the conjugate formula:
wT (z) = max
p∈∆(K)
(vT (p)− < p, z >), and vT (p) = inf
z∈IRK
(wT (z)+ < p, z >).
And (wT )T satisfies the dual recursive formula:
wT+1(z) = min
y∈∆(J)
max
i∈I
T
T + 1
wT
(
T + 1
T
z − 1
T
∑
j∈J
yj
(
Gk(i, j)
)
k
)
.
There are also strong relations between the optimal strategies of the players in
the primal and dual games, and this gives a way to compute recursively optimal
strategies of the uninformed player in the finite game (see also [31] on this topic).
Repeated games with incomplete information, as well as stochastic games, can
also be studied in a functional analysis setup called the operator approach. This
general approach is based on the study of the recursive formula ([67], [39], [92]).
In [62], the standard model, as well as the proof of theorem 1, is generalized
to the case where the state is not fixed at the beginning of the game, but evolves
according to a Markov chain uniquely observed by player 1 (see also [56] for non
observable actions, [47] and [32] for the difficulty of computing the value, [64] for
the generalization to a state process controlled and observed by player 1, and [68]
for several kinds of stochastic games with lack of information on one side). It is
known since [77] that the uniform value may not exist in general for stochastic
games with lack of information on one side (where the stochastic game to be
played is first randomly selected and announced to player 1 only).
Blackwell’s approachability theorem has been extended to infinite dimensional
spaces by Lehrer ([42]). Approachability theory has strong links with the exis-
tence of no-regret strategies (first studied in [29], see also [25], [69], [43], [30], [8]
and the recent book [9]), convergence of simple procedures to the set of correlated
equilibria ([29]), and calibration ([24], [41]). The links between merging, repu-
tation phenomena and repeated games with incomplete information have been
studied in [80], where several existing results are unified. Finally, no-regret and
approachability have also been studied when the players have bounded computa-
tional capacities (finite automata, bounded recall strategies) ([45], [44]).
Let us mention also that de Meyer and Moussa Saley studied the modelization
via Brownian motions in financial models ([17]). They introduced a marked game
based on a repeated game with lack of information on one side, and showed the
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endogenous apparition of a Brownian motion (see [15] for incomplete information
on both sides).
VIII.2 Non zero-sum games
In the setup of section VI, it is interesting to study the number of communi-
cation stages which is needed to construct the different equilibria. This number
is linked with the convergence of the associated bimartingales (see [87], [4], [20],
[23]). Let us mention also that F. Forges ([22]) gave a similar characterization of
equilibrium payoffs, for a larger notion of equilibria called communication equi-
libria (see also [21] for correlated equilibria). Amitai ([2]) studied the set of
equilibrium payoffs in case of lack of information on both sides. Aumann and
Hart ([5] characterized the equilibrium payoffs in two player games with lack of
information on one side when long, payoff-irrelevant, preplay communication is
allowed (see [1] for incomplete information on both sides).
The particular case where each player knows his own payoffs is particularly
worthwhile studying (known own payoffs). In the two-player case with lack of in-
formation on one side, this amounts to say that player 2’s payoffs do not depend
on the selected state. In this case, Shalev ([70]) showed that any equilibrium pay-
off can be obtained as the payoff of an equilibrium which is completely revealing.
This result generalizes to the non zero-sum case of lack of information of both
sides (see the unpublished manuscript [36]), but unfortunately uniform equilibria
may fail to exist even though both players known their own payoffs.
Another model deals with the symmetric case, where the players have an in-
complete, but identical, knowledge of the selected state. After each stage they
receive the same signal, which may depend on the state. A. Neyman and S. Sorin
have proved the existence of equilibrium payoffs in the case of two players (see
[57], the zero-sum case being solved in [35] and [19]).
Few papers study the case of more than 2 players. The existence of uni-
form equilibrium has been studied for 3 players and lack of information on one
side ([60]), and in the case of two states of nature it appears that a completely
revealing equilibria, or a joint plan equilibria by one of the informed players, al-
ways exists. Concerning n-player repeated games with incomplete information
and signals, several papers study how the initial information can be strategically
transmitted, independently of the payoffs ([63], [61], and [65] for an application to
a cryptographic model). As an application, the existence of completely revealing
equilibria is obtained in particular cases.
Repeated games with incomplete information have been used to study per-
turbations of repeated games with complete information (see [26] and [10] for
Folk theorem-like results, [6] for enforcing cooperation in games with a Pareto-
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dominant outcome, and [33] for a perturbation with known own payoffs). The
case where the players have different discount factors has also been investigated
([46], [10]).
IX. Future directions
Several open problems are well formulated and deserve attention. Does a
uniform equilibrium always exist in two-player repeated games with lack of in-
formation on one side and general signalling, or in n-player repeated games with
lack of information on one side ? More conceptually, one should look for classes
of n-player repeated games with incomplete information which allow for the ex-
istence of equilibria, and/or for a tractable description of equilibrium payoffs (or
at least of some of these payoffs). Regarding applications, there is certainly a lot
of room in the vast fields of financial markets, cryptology, and sequential decision
problems.
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